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Abstract 
 
Only a handful of studies have estimated organic food demand. These all focus on specific food 
sub-markets assuming separability from other food consumption. However, consumers 
typically associate attributes such as e.g. healthiness and environment friendliness with organic 
variants of most types of food. If such general organic attributes are important for consumer 
behaviour then separability may not hold and what could be termed organic crowding out 
might result. In this paper we utilize a unique Danish micro panel where all food demand is 
registered on a disaggregated level with an organic/non-organic indicator to estimate a general 
food demand system with organic variants. We clearly reject the usual separability assumption 
and find that our data is consistent with organic crowding out in the Danish food market. In 
addition estimation of a general demand system makes calculation of economy wide organic 
price elasticities and other insights into the structure of organic food demand possible.  
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1. Introduction 
Organic food production is characterised by substantial restrictions on the use of pesticides and 
chemical fertilizer
1. These constraints imply that organic production costs typically are higher 
than for comparable conventional foods. On the other hand many consumers believe that 
organic food production performs better than conventional food production with regard to 
environmental externalities, animal welfare, and the health risks associated with food 
consumption. Organic foods may also differ from conventionally produced foods with regard 
to traditional quality indicators such as taste, texture, appearance etc.  
  One would expect organic and non-organic variants of a specific type of food (milk 
for example) to be close substitutes and previous estimation studies have modelled 
organics/non-organics as different qualities of the same food type assuming separability from 
other food consumption. Glaser and Thompson (1998, 2000, 2001), Thompson and Glaser 
(2001), Wier and Smed (2002) and Smed (2003)
2 all find large own price elasticities for 
various organic foods (close to or below -2) and also large demand elasticities with respect to 
the price of conventional variants of the same food type (often close to or greater than 1). This 
suggests that in most food submarkets a substantial organic market share increase is to be 
expected if the organic price premium is reduced. If the separability assumption holds there is 
no reason to expect any systematic effect on the organic market shares in other food 
submarkets.   
  The separability assumption used in these studies is often necessary because of data 
limitations and also seems reasonable when considering attributes like flavour and texture that 
must be specific for each food type. On the other hand, attributes like environment friendliness 
and healthiness that consumers typically associate with organic variants of most or all types of 
food, are not necessarily perceived by consumers as specific for each food type. If consumers 
credit organic variants of different food types with the same general organic attributes then 
organic variants of different foods may become closer substitutes than the corresponding 
conventional foods. With such a demand pattern one would expect an organic market share 
increase in one food market to cause organic market shares to fall in other food markets i.e. 
organic crowding out. 
  In surveys on organic buying motives consumers typically state that attributes like 
environment friendliness and healthiness are important buying motives
3. If this is so the 
crowding out effect could be substantial. The implication of this could be that although 
                                                 
1 Though the specific production constraints that must be met for certification as an organic farmer varies between 
countries and in many cases between competing schemes with in the same country (for surveys her off see e.g. 
Lampkin et al. (1999a and b), Sylvander and Le Floc’h-Wadel (2000), Wier and Calverley (1999)) severe 
constraints on chemical fertilizer and pesticide use are always implied.  
2 The four Thompson and Glaser studies use US scanner data covering milk, frozen vegetables, and baby food 
assume separability as does the Wier and Smed study covering dairy products, cereals and bread, meat and ‘other’ 
products using Danish self reported consumer panel data. Smed(2003) using the same type of Danish data tests the 
separability structure of organic/non-organic variants of different types of milk but assumes separability from other 
food types. In adition to these demand estimation studies a number of hedonic WTP estimates for the organic 
attribute have been made see e.g. Boland and Schroeder (2002), West et al. (2002), Nimon and 
Beghin(1999),Gevindasamy (1998).   
3  This is seen in Surveys/studies of Consumers from Denmark (Bjarke (1992), Scan-Ad (1998), Infood (1997a), 
Infood(1998b) Land(1998), Scan-Ad (2002)),as well as from other countries like Canada (Rojas (1997)), Holland 
(Hack (1993)), France ( Sylvander(1993)) Germany (Frick and von Alvensleben(1997)) and the USA  (Swanson 
and Lewis(1993) ,Cook(1991), Cook(1998) , Park and Lohr(1996) Hall et al. (1989), Huang (1996) Buzby and 
Skees (1994) Goldman and Clancy (1991) Byrne et al. (1994) Jolly(1991a and b) ). For a comprehensive review in 
Danish covering many of these studies see Wier and Calverley (1999).  
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previous studies indicate that organic price premium reductions have a substantial effect on the 
organic market shares in most food submarkets, crowding out could cause the potential for 
increasing the aggregate organic food share through price premium reductions to be (much) 
lower.  
  In this paper we develop a utility model with general organic attributes and derive 
implications for consumer demand. We then exploit a unique Danish micro panel where food 
demand registered on a disaggregated level in all cases has an indicator of weather the good is 
organic/non-organic to test the model empirically. The household level panel data makes it 
possible to identify household specific parameters so that we can estimate household level 
demand systems. Our analysis covers Danish medium to heavy organic food consumers. 
  The empirical evidence against the separability assumption is firm for this group of 
consumers. This implies that systems estimated on our data assuming separability will be 
biased. We find that our data is consistent with organic crowding out in this part of the Danish 
food market. We find relatively small aggregate organic own price elasticities on the order of -
0.5 and find systematically lower food budget elasticities for organic foods than for 
corresponding non-organic foods. 
In section 2 we develop a model of organic food demand and in section 3 tests of 
different utility specifications are developed. Section 4 describes our data and section 5 
presents our estimation results and some implications. Section 6 concludes the paper with a 
brief summary of our results.   
 
2. Modelling Organic Food Demand. 
 
Our data distinguishes between food types and organic/non-organic variants but does not 
generally contain information about specific quality attributes. Further our ambition of 
modelling interactions covering the whole food market forces us to consider fairly aggregated 
food goods (e.g. dairy products, rather than whole milk, low fat milk, cream etc.). Thus our 
starting point is the following general utility function defined on goods at this level:    
 
  () U U x = ￿          ( 1 )  
 
where U denotes consumer utility derived from the consumption of a vector x of foods 
(differentiated by food type at a fairly aggregated level and by organic/non-organic variant), 
and  (.) U ￿  satisfies the usual regularity conditions. Though specific attributes are not observed 
any structure imposed on  (.) U ￿ should reflect the structure expected to be generated by 
underlying attributes.   
  First consider the classic property of weak separability that  (.) U ￿  is said to satisfy if it 
can be expressed as: 
 
 
11 ( ) ( ( ),..., ( ),..., ( ))
ii nn U x U ux ux ux = ￿         ( 2 )  
 
where x
i are mutually exclusive vectors of foods so that 
1 ( ,... ,..., )
i n x xx x =  and  u
i is sub-
utility derived from consumption of food sub vector x
i . Any given consumer good enters into 
one and only one sub-utility function u
i . The idea behind weak separability is that there are 
natural mutually exclusive groupings of related goods that reflect the consumer’s budget  
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decisions. Previous studies assume that organic and non-organic variants of a given food type 
are such natural groupings i.e.:  
 
 
11 1 ( ( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , ))
o c i io ic n no nc UU u xx u xx uxx =      (3) 
 
where u
i is sub-utility derived from consumption of food type  i and o and c in the subscript 
distinguish between the organic and conventional variant of each good. Intuitively the 
separable utility structure makes it possible to estimate sub-demand systems for each group of 
goods conditional only on the total budget allocated to the group
4.  
  When focussing on attributes such as texture, taste, appearance, freshness etc. organic 
and non-organic potatoes, for example, look like different qualities of essentially the same 
good and technically they can substitute each other in most (or all) household consumption 
processes. Thus when conventional quality indicators are considered the grouping of organic 
and non organic variants does seem natural. Further many consumer surveys/studies suggest 
that conventional quality attributes are highly important when deciding whether to buy organic 
food variants
5. Consumers in our dataset may, therefore, satisfy the property of weak 
separability as expressed in (3) and our model must allow for this possibility.  
  On the other hand, consumers in most surveys also associate attributes like 
environment friendliness and healthiness, with organic variants of most or all types of food and 
typically also indicate these as important buying motives (see references above). Some studies 
suggest that consumers in certain situations differentiate between types of healthiness 
contained in organic foods
6, however these attributes are not necessarily perceived by 
consumers as specific for each food type. Other studies suggest that consumers perceptions of 
healthiness and environment friendliness associated with organic food production are quite 
holistic i.e. that consumers generally perceive these basic attributes as highly correlated/ 
integrated
7. Thus to some extent consumers may be associating the same general organic 
attribute with organic variants of most or all food types. When only general organic attributes 
are considered grouping all organic variants in a separable structure may be more natural then 
grouping organic and non-organic variants of the same food type i.e.: 
 
 
11 ( ,..., ,..., , ( ,..., ,..., ))
ci cn c o oi on o UU x x xux x x =      (4) 
 
where u
o is sub-utility derived from consumption of general organic attributes.  
  Since the groupings implied by weak separability are mutually exclusive this structure 
would force us to choose either a separability structure implied by conventional food attributes 
(3) or a structure implied by general organic attributes (4). Needless to say consumer surveys 
and casual observation suggest that food specific attributes are highly important to consumers 
                                                 
4 See Goldman and Uzawa (1964) for the original results and e.g. Pudney (1981) for a nice overview of this and 
other separability concepts. 
5 See Infood (1997a), Land(1998), Scan-Ad(1998) and Scan-Ad(2002) for studies of Danish consumers and e.g. 
Huang(1996), Thompson and  Kidwell(1998), Loureiro and Hine(2002) for studies of US consumers. 
6   Buzby and Skees (1994) and Frick and von Alvensleben(1997) find that households with children are more 
concerned about pesticides in foods. In the Danish context Weir and Smed(2000) find that such households consume 
more organic foods than other households. This could imply that consumers distinguish between healthiness 
contained in infant foods and foods consumed by other household members – valuing healthiness 
in infant foods higher.  
7  See Thøgersen(1998) and Beckmann et al (2001) for studies of Danish Consumers suggesting this.   
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so that a description that does not embody this is unrealistic. We therefore do not consider 
specification (4) to be a serious modelling alternative. The real questions here are: 
•   weather general organic attributes are important enough to consumers so as to make 
specification (3) that only embodies food specific attributes questionable and if so, 
•   how should organic attributes be introduced into our utility model.  
What we need, for the analysis in this paper is therefore, is a utility structure that allows for 
both conventional and general organic attributes in an intuitive way. 
  In the literature two ways of imposing structure that are less restrictive than weak 
separability have been suggested: 1) the latent separability specification developed by Blundell 
and Robin (2000) and 2) the characteristics specification attributed to Gorman (1956). Both 
are more general specifications that emit weak separability (2) as a special case.  
  
Latent separability 
 
Taking outset in the weak separability specification with mutually exclusive grouping of 
consumed goods Blundell and Robin (2000) generalise by allowing groups to overlap. A utility 
function  (.) U ￿  is said to satisfy the property of latent separability if: 
 
 
11
1
1
( ) ( ( ),..., ( ),..., ( )
,...,
n
ii nn i
n
i
Argmax
U xU u x u x u x x x
xx =

==  
 ∑ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿
    (5) 
 
where the sub-vectors
i x ￿  no longer need be mutually exclusive. In addition (5) also imposes the 
restriction that the allocation of x between sub-vectors
i x ￿  maximise utility.  
  First we note that if sub-vectors 
i x ￿  are mutually exclusive then weak separability 
results since in this case only one allocation of total consumption x between sub-utilities is 
possible. The advantage of the latent separability generalisation can be illustrated by letting 
sub-utilities u
i represent e.g. utility different family members or utility derived from a different 
process like eating breakfast and lunch. With such interpretations the mutually exclusive 
groupings of weak separability becomes unrealistic since several household members may 
consume the same good or a given good may be consumed for lunch as well as for breakfast. 
In contrast latent separability allows goods to enter more than one sub-utility function. Since 
goods must be allocated by the household between different members or process when these 
are not mutually exclusive assuming that this is done so as to maximise household utility seems 
natural. 
  In it self relaxing the assumption of mutually exclusive definition sets is attractive in 
our specific context. One could in some sense combine the properties of functions (3) and (4) 
by designating sub-utility function representing conventional attributes of each food type and a 
sub-utility function representing general organic attributes. The organic good variants could 
enter the sub-utility function for conventional good attributes as well as the sub-utility function 
for general organic attributes. However, the latent separability property implies that consumers 
(optimally) allocate the total amount of each organic good consumed between these two sub-
utility functions. This does not fit our context. We don’t think that consumers allocate organic 
foods either to generating conventional types of utility or to generating utility associated with 
e.g. environment friendliness. Rather we think of each unit of an organic good as possessing 
both sets of attributes in fixed proportions and so generating both types of utility when they are 
consumed. Though estimates of the content of general organic attributes may vary substantially  
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across households and over time, the actual content of these attributes is presumably given by 
production processes beyond the controlled of households and therefore presumably perceived 
as fixed by most consumers. As we shall se below this is precisely what is implied by the 
characteristics specification. 
 
Characteristics specification 
 
In the characteristics model (attributed to Gorman (1956)) a given consumer good is seen as a 
vector of characteristics and goods are distinguished by containing characteristics in different 
proportions. Consumer utility (U) is derived from consumption of characteristics (not from 
consumption of goods directly) so that the consumer utility function has the following form: 
 
 
12 ( () , () , . . . ())
m U Uu x u x u x =        ( 7 )  
 
where u
i is the amount of utility derived from consumption of characteristic i that is contained 
in  the total good vector x. This resembles the latent separability specification except that here 
the total consumption vector enters into all sub-utilities. The consumer can not allocate goods 
between sub-utilities since the content of different characteristics is intrinsic to the type of 
good and he therefore only chooses the total amount of each good to consume. This seems 
more agreeable in our context. 
  Since we do not have data on specific attributes we must use a much aggregated 
specification of  (7) i.e.: 
 
 
11 1 1 ( ( , ),..., ( , ),...., ( , ), ( ,..., ,..., ))
o c i io ic n no nc o o io no UU u xx u xx uxx ux x x =     (8) 
 
where we have aggregated traditional quality attributes like taste freshness for each food type into 
one aggregate characteristic possessed by both conventional and organic variants. We have also 
aggregated the general organic characteristic (e.g. healthiness, animal and environment friendliness 
etc.) into one general organic characteristic.  
  This aggregation of course substantially reduces the versatility and descriptive power 
for which characteristics modeling is known (see e.g. Lancaster (1966) for a classic 
presentation). However, we do get a generalization of the separability concept that combines 
(3) and (4) in an intuitive way. With this specification an organic carrot competes with non-
organic carrots at supplying the aggregated conventional carrot attribute while competing with 
organic potatoes and milk at supplying the aggregated general organic attribute. 
  Often the linear characteristics specification (where u
i are linier functions) is assumed. 
Linearity seems intuitive when considering disaggregated characteristics (like e.g. vitamin or 
fat content) and disaggregated goods. Further linearity typically implies corner solutions (i.e. 
only one or a few goods containing a given characteristic are consumed) which also seems 
reasonable from casual observation of the structure of disaggregated demand. In our context 
the assumption may be reasonable for the general organic characteristic since studies of Danish 
consumers (as noted above) suggest that these attributes perceive in a highly aggregated way 
and we will use it below.  However when goods and conventional characteristics are 
aggregated as we must do here linearity seems restrictive and we will not impose this 
assumption on the food type sub-utility functions.  
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Price elasticity implications of the characteristics specification 
 
In this subsection we derive some elasticity implications of the general attribute specification 
(8). We contrast with the food type separability specification (3) which is obtained from (8) 
directly when dU/du
o=0. In doing so we keep our perspective in mind i.e. if there is a general 
organic demand effect we do not expect it to dominate food type attributes.        
  Consider the consumers problem of maximizing utility maximization under a budget 
constraint with the general attribute specification (8).  
 
 
11 1 1
11 ( ( , ),..., ( , ), ( ,......, ))
, ,..., ,
. .                                   0
o c nn on c o o n o
o c no nc
Max
UU u xx uxx ux x
xx xx
st px
=
≤
      
 
 
This yields the following set of first order conditions: 
 
 
 
11 1 1 1
11 1 1
( /) (/ ) (/) (/ )
(/) (/ )
( /) (/ ) (/) (/ )
(/) (/ )
oo o o o
cc
n o nnn o oon o
nc n n nc
p U uux U uux
pU u u x
p U uux U uux
pU u u x
δδδδ δδ δδ
δδδδ
λ
δδ δδ δδ δδ
δδ δδ
  +
 
 
  =
 
+  
 
 
￿￿     (9) 
 
whereλ is the LaGrange multiplier to the budget constraint (i.e. the marginal utility value of 
income). Imposing linearity on u
o(.) and appropriately rescaling the unit of measurement  of 
each good so that /
o io u x δδ =1 fore all i the first order conditions for the representative food 
type i can be written more compactly as:  
 
 
/
/
ioo i i o
i
ici i c
p ux
p ux
λδ δ
λ
δδ
   −
=   
  
       ( 1 0 )  
 
where  /( / )
i i U u λλ δδ = is the marginal utility value of income expressed in food type i utility 
equivalents and  (/) /
oo Uu λδ δ λ =  is utility value of the general organic attribute expressed in 
monetary equivalents.  
  Now consider the marginal effect on food type i demand of a price change of variant k 
(where k can take the value o or c) of another food type j. The effect on equilibrium is found 
by differentiating (10) i.e.:  
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oi o
io
jk jkj k io o i
i
jk ic ic
ic
jk jk
x
p p p
A
p p x
p
δλ δ
δδ λ δλ
λ
δ δ
δ
  
∆−     −    +=      ∆      
  
      
 
where 
ir
jk ∆  is Kronecker’s delta (taking the value 1 when jk=ir and 0 otherwise) and  
22
22
//
//
i io io i io ic
i io ic i ic ic
u xx u xx
A
u xx u xx
δδ δ δδ δ
δδ δ δδ δ

= 

.  Solving for demand effects we have: 
 
 
1
()
            
io i o
ii o i o o i
jk jkj k j k
ic i
ii c i c
jk jk jk
x
p
p pp
A
x
p
pp
δδ λ δ λ
λλ λ
δδ δ
δδ λ
λ
δδ
−
 
∆+ − −  
  =
 
∆+    
 
     (11) 
     
Since A is symmetric so is 
1 A
−  and defining 
1 3 1
3 2
a a
A
a a
− 
= 

 we can write (11) as: 
 
 
 
1
13 13
32 32
3
[( ) ]
[( ) ]
io o
io ic jk jk io o ic i
jk jk i i
io ic jk io o ic ic o
jk jk
jk jk
x
a
aa pp ap a p
aa p ap a p x
a
p p
δδ λ
δδ λ δλ
λλ
δ λ δδ λ
δδ
  
    ∆+∆  −+    =+ −       ∆+∆ −+        
  
   (12) 
 
  As initially noted in this subsection if dU/du
o=0  weak separability in food types 
results. When we correspondingly set  0
o λ =  and  /0
oj k p δλ δ =  in (12) the last element of the 
right hand side becomes zero and when 
jk p  is outside the separable group (12) reduces to: 
 
 
13
32
[ ]
[]
io
jk io ic i
jk io ic ic
jk
x
p ap ap
p ap ap x
p
δ
δ δλ
δ δ
δ

  +  =   +   

       ( 1 3 )  
 
This is the classic first order conditions for weak separability (see e.g. Goldman and Uzawa 
(1964), Deaton and Muellbauer(1980) or Pudney (1981)). In (14) the elements of the right 
hand side vector are the marginal effect on consumption of a change in the budget allotted to 
food type i (which for normal goods will be positive). A change in the price of a good outside 
the separable group only affects demand of goods within the group through the budget effect 
(/
i jk p δλ δ ). Depending on which outside price is being changed the budget effect may vary in 
sign (positive if the separable group substitutes or negative if it complements the good in 
question) and size but the ratio between the two price effects in (13) will be the same for all  
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prices 
jk p  outside the weakly separable group because the budget effect cancels out (the 
classical weak separability result). 
  We now evaluate (12) to determine how the introduction of general attributes 
changes the structure cross price effects with other food types (i.e. 
ir
jk ∆ =0). In addition to the 
ratio preserving budget effect in (13) we also have an effect from the general organic attribute 
(last element in (12)) that may cause ratios to deviate between
jk p . From standard assumptions 
we know that a1 <0, a2 <0, a3 >0, 
i λ >0 and 
o λ >0. Further an increase in the price of an 
organic good j must cause the shadow price of the organic attribute to rise (i.e.  /
o jo p δλ δ >0). 
Finally we generally expect an increase in the price of a non-organic good j to cause the 
shadow price of the organic attribute to fall (i.e.  /
o jo p δλ δ <0) since a main effect will be to 
shift consumption toward the organic variant of food type j. A positive sign could result if 
organic and non-organic variants of food type j are poor substitutes in the food type j attribute 
and if the j attribute at the same time complements e.g. food attribute k with a large organic 
variant market share. In this case the fall in attribute j consumption could cause a net fall in 
organic attribute consumption. However this is unlikely since by assumption organic and non 
organic variants are close substitutes in the food type attribute. We therefore generally expect 
the following to hold: 
 
  1( / )
o jo a p δλ δ − >0 and 
  1( / )
o jc a p δλ δ − <0  and          (14) 
  3( / )
o jo a p δλ δ − <0 and 
  3( / )
o jc a p δλ δ − >0 
 
  This also seems intuitive. Irrespective of weather two food type attributes are 
substitutes or complements we would generally expect the introduction of a general organic 
attributes to make the two organic variants closer substitutes relative to the corresponding 
organic and non-organic variants. General organic attributes cause organic variants to compete 
relatively more with each other than with the respective non-organic counterparts. This is the 
effect we call organic crowding out.  
  Now consider cross price elasticities between organic and non organic variants of the 
same food type. Using (13), inserting for Kronecker’s delta and rearranging we have: 
 
  32 3 [ () ] ( 1 )
ic i o
io o ic i
ioi o i o
x
ap a p a
p pp
δδ λ δ λ
λλ
δδ δ
=− + + −       
As long as x
ic is a normal good in production of food type i utility (see above) we know that 
0
32 [ () ] 0
io ic ap a p λ −+ >  so that the first element on the right hand side of the equation is 
positive. Noting that  ( /) /
oo Uu λδ δ λ =  is utility value of the general organic attribute 
expressed in monetary equivalents by definition we have that /1
oi o p δλ δ ≤  and thus that the 
second element is non-negative
8. Thus by Slutsky symmetry we have:    
  
                                                 
8 In fact since there are many organic goods that are close substitutes in the organic attribute we expect 
/
o jk p δλ δ to be substantially lower than 1.    
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   0, 0
ic io
io ic
xx
pp
δδ
δδ
>>         ( 1 5 )  
    
  Again this seems intuitive. Though we have introduced general organic attributes the 
original food type attributes are still present so that organic and non-organic variants of a given 
food type continue to be substitutes. 
 
3. Testing utility specifications 
 
Consumer surveys and casual observation suggest that food specific attributes are highly 
important to consumers and a description that does not embody this seems unrealistic. We 
therefore do not seriously consider specification (4), where general organic attributes dominate 
consumer choice to such a degree that organic goods can be modelled as a separable group. 
The real questions here are weather food specific attributes are so important to consumers so 
as to make specification (3) embodying the intuitively reasonable assumption of weak 
separability of the food types applicable and if not 2) whether our data is consistent with the 
demand structure implied by the general attribute specification (8).    
 
Testing the weak separability specification 
 
In this paper we use the AIDS estimation framework (see Deaton and Muellbauer(1980)). As 
is the case for a wide class of flexible functional forms (see Blackorby et al.(1977) this 
specification is separability inflexible. This means that an AIDS system is globally inconsistent 
with (can not result from) a utility function with a separable sub-group of consumer goods
9.  
Since the AIDS specification is a flexible local approximation of the demand system one can 
resort to testing separability locally (i.e. for a given data point such as the data mean) as done 
by e.g. Moschini et al. (1994). However the interpretation of local separability tests in a system 
that is globally inconsistent with separability is not clear and this approach has been criticized 
(see e.g. Aizcorbe (1992)). Instead we use an alternative approach developed by Browning and 
Maghir (1991). 
  Following Browning and Maghir we consider the conditional cost function:  
 
( ,,) ( ,) ) C pxU M I N p x xx U
+− + + +− =| = U(      ( 1 6 )    
 
where  x
−  is the vector of quantities of the subset of consumption goods on which the cost 
function is conditioned,  p
+ the price vector of the subset of consumption goods whose 
quantities ( x
+) the consumer sets so as to minimize expenditure ( px
++ ) subject to the given 
utility level U . Note that all though we consider a conditional system no structure has been  
imposed on the underlying utility function U(.).  
  The AIDS specification for this system is: 
 
  ln (,,)l n (,) ( (,) C pxU a px U bpx
+− +− +− =+ 
 
                                                 
9 Global separability of an AIDS system can only be ensured if one also makes the highly restrictive assumptions of  
homotheticity for the separable group and that all income elasticities in this group are 1 (see Moschini et al. (1994))   
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  where 
 
  ln( , ) ( ) l n ½ l n l n
i i j
ii j
ii j
a px x p p p αγ
+− − =+ ∑∑ ∑     (17) 
  a n d    
  ln ( , ) ( )ln
i
i
i
b px x p β
+− − =∑  
 
which gives the following system of derived budget share equations:  
 
  ( ) ln ( )ln( / ( , ))
ii
ii j i
j
w xp x y a p x αγ β
−− + − =+ + ∑     (18) 
 
where y = px
++  is expenditure on the subset of goods in question (see Deaton and 
Muellbauer(1980) for derivation details). Note that the parameters  () i x α
−  and  () i x β
−  of the 
AIDS system are specified as functions of the conditioning variables  x
−  whereas we (like 
Browning and Maghir) assume that the  ij γ  parameters are independent of the conditioning 
variables. After assuming a functional form for  (.) i α  and  (.) i β  this system can be estimated 
using data on prices  p
+, quantities of conditioning variables x
−  and expenditures y.  
  Browning and Meghir show that if the group of goods in question is a separable 
group (i.e. if  ,) ) ,) x xx x
+− + − = U( U(u(  then the cost function can be expressed as 
(, (, ) ) C ph xU
+−  i.e. we have that:   
 
( ,( , ) ) ( ) , ) )
x C ph xU M I N p x x x U +
+− + + + − =| = U(u(     (19) 
   
In the corresponding AIDS specification  (,) h xU
− takes the place of U  in (13) and parameters 
i α  and  i β  no longer depend on the conditioning variables (i.e. under separability the effect of 
these only works through the budget y).  
  This allows us to test the separability specification against a fairly general specification 
of the unconstrained utility function. We simply test whether the set of coefficients to 
conditioning variables for the chosen specification of   () i x α
−  and  () i x β
−  in the estimated 
system (18) can be set to zero.  Though the non-separable version of (18) imposes a number of 
restriction (e.g. that the  ij γ  parameters are independent of the conditioning variables) this test 
for separability is more general and its interpretation clearer than local separability tests. 
 
Testing the general attribute specification 
 
It turns out that we reject separability for all food type groups in our data and therefore turn to 
testing the less restrictive general attribute specification (8). Ideally we would like to test this 
structure against a general specification of the unconstrained utility function. However, for this 
no existing procedure seems obvious. 
  One possibility that we have considered is to extend the Browning/Maghir approach.  
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Taking outset in (10) one could define the corrected organic price
ioi o o pp λ =− ￿ . Using this 
price instead of 
io p  in (18) separability would result if the general attribute specification (8) is 
the underlying utility structure (i.e. if the general attribute specification applies we should be 
able to test the set of coefficients to conditioning variables in  () i x α
−  and  () i x β
−  to zero). The 
problem with this approach is practical. 
o λ  is an unknown function of  the conditioning 
variables x
−  and x
+that must be specified and estimated. Disentangling  (,)
io x x λ
+− from  
() i x α
−  and  () i x β
−  when estimating (18) would demand a lot from our data (or restrictive 
functional assumptions).  
  Instead we take another approach. Given that separability is rejected we estimate a 
general demand system and then check if the resulting price effects correspond to the effects 
we would expect with general organic attributes.  
  Barring inferiority we found that organic and non-organic variants will continue to be 
substitutes under the general organic attribute specification (condition (15) above). This 
condition (positive within food type cross price elasticities) is easy to check after estimation of 
a general demand system.  
  We can also derive conditions on cross price elasticities with other food types. 
Consider the two ratios of compensated price cross elasticities 
io
jo
ic
jo
s
s
 (the demand elasticity of 
the organic over the non-organic variant of food i both with respect to the organic variant of 
food j) and 
io
jc
ic
jc
s
s
(the demand elasticity of the organic over the non-organic  variant of food i 
both with respect to the non-organic variant of food j). The ration of these ratios (R) is:  
 
 
/( / ) /( / ) / /
// /
/ ( /) / ( /) / /
io io ioj o j o i o i oj c j c i o i oj o i oj c
jo jc
ic i c i cj o j o i c i cj c j c i c i cj oi cj c
jo jc
ss x ppx x ppx x p x p
R
s sx p p xx p p x x p x p
δδ δδ δδ δδ
δδ δδ δδ δδ
== =  (20) 
 
Inserting (12) after regrouping we have:  
 
13 1
32 3
13 1
32 3
( / ) [ ( ) ](/ )
( /) [ ( ) ] ( /)
/
( / ) [ ( ) ](/ )
( /) [ ( ) ] ( /)
ij o i o o i c oj o
io io ij o i o o i c oj o
jo jc
ic ic ij c i o o i c oj c
jo jc
ij c i o o i c oj c
pa p a p a p
ss pa p a p a p
ss pa p a p a p
pa p a p a p
δλ δ λ δλ δ
δλ δ λ δλ δ
δλ δ λ δλ δ
δλ δ λ δλ δ
 −+ −
 −+ −  =
 −+ −
 −+ − 
    (21) 
 
When only considering the weakly separable food type attributes ( /0
io jk p δλ δ = ) we se that 
R=1 (the classical separability result) and that only the last element of each of the four 
differences in (21) can cause a deviation from 1. We can therefore use (14) to evaluate how the 
introduction of general organic effects changes R. The top element of the top ratio increases 
while the bottom element decreases so that the top ratio increases (i.e. organic variants become 
relatively closer substitutes). In the bottom ratio the top element decreases while the bottom 
element increases so that the bottom ration decreases. Thus if the first element of each of the 
four differences is positive (and the introduction of the second element does not cause the sign 
to change) we expect to observe R>1.  
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  The intuition here is that where we under weak separability have constant within 
group price effect ratios general organic attributes cause organic variants to become relatively 
closer substitutes. The specifics of how general organic attributes affect R vary depending on 
whether food type attributes are complements or substitutes and on whether general organic 
effects are so large that they cause the sign of the cross price effect to change. However for 
each set of observed signs in the price effects used to calculate R we can deduce whether the 
sign combination could be generated by a general organic attribute utility specification and if so 
which constraints R must satisfy. This is done in detail in appendix 1.  
  These checks constitute a real test since substantial restrictions on resulting cross 
price elasticities must be satisfied but it is not a strict test of general organic attributes in the 
same way the Browning/Maghir approach tests separability. Since other utility function 
structures might also generate price effects that pass these tests this only indicates that our data 
is consistent with the general attribute utility specification – it does not rule out other 
structures. On the other hand one of the general attribute implications that we test for (the 
presence of organic crowding) may have independent interest since some policy implications 
follow directly from organic crowding out irrespective of the underlying utility specification.  
 
4. Data 
 
The data used in this study is from self reported consumer diaries collected by GfK Consumer 
Scan Denmark (see www.gfk.dk) as part of their consumer panel. GfK uses the panel data to 
do market analyses for its customers (e.g. evaluation of TV-add campaigns etc.).  
  At any one time during the data period (1997-2000) the consumer panel consisted of 
about 2000 Danish households. About 20% of the panel are replaced each year. When 
recruiting representativeness with regard to regional distribution, household size and type, age, 
profession etc is attempted. Panel participants are not paid but awarded token consumer good 
prizes each year.    
  In each family a Diary keeper is appointed (typically the person responsible for most 
of the shopping) Each week the diary keeper fills in a detailed pre-printed diary form with 
information about all types of food, groceries and other ‘non-durable’ daily goods purchased 
by family members and sends a the report to GfK
10. The average report rate is about 80% with 
rates dropping to about 70% during summer and Christmas vacations. In our version of the 
panel the average number of week diaries per household is 95.  
  For each purchased good reported in the week diary trip the following information is recorded: 
•   Scanner data (EAN-code i.e. bar code or “stregkode”) see www.ean.dk for more informa-
tion). Our data contain a number of more aggregated good group codes derived from the 
EAN-codes one of which is very close to the EAN-code.  
•   Number of units purchased.  
•   Price per unit.  
•   Whether the good was on sale or not. 
•   Organic/conventional indicator (this is recorded for all goods that can possibly be organic). 
•   Other good characteristics (these vary in number and type between goods, e.g. for milk 
indicators for fat content and type (chocolate milk, buttermilk etc.) are reported for some  
goods no characteristics are reported). 
                                                 
10 Daily goods not covered include snaks (gum, chocolate etc.) consumed outside the home, consumption in 
canteens or at the work place or in the hospital, daycare institutions etc.  
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In addition the following information is recorded for each shopping trip: 
•   Name/type of store (e.g. Kvickly, SuperBrugsen, Bilka, Irma …).  
•   The day of the week and time of day of the shopping trip. 
•   Who participated in the shopping trip  
•   The total value of the goods purchased on the shopping trip. 
Finally, households annually supply information on: 
•   socio-demographics, 
•   education 
•   income category 
•   club membership and media use etc. 
For further details see GfK’s documentation in GfK(2001) or the extensive English language 
description in Andersen(2002). 
  Andersen (2001) also provides an extensive analysis of the panels representativeness concluding 
that the panel is quite representative in the investigated socio-demographic dimensions (although 
the fact that participating households are willing to undertake the extensive work of filling out 
diaries with only token compensation suggests that they in some respects must be unrepresentative 
of the general population). Further the long participation time for panel households and the fact 
that GfK systematically consistency checks registered EAN-codes and attributes (including the 
organic/non-organic code) suggests that data quality is high.  
In our context two data characteristics are especially important. First of all the complete 
categorisation of organic/non-organic food variants is off course essential for our study. Second 
the fact that each household is observed many times over the data period makes it possible identify 
household specific parameters, when estimating a demand system and thereby take account of 
otherwise unobserved heterogeneity between households.  
Since we need to cover all organic food consumption we must use fairly aggregated food 
goods for estimation. For the study in this paper data is aggregated into six aggregated foods: 
-  Dairy products (milk, butter, cheese etc.) 
-  Cereals (oats, cornflakes, bread, etc.) 
-  Other foods (all other foods)  
All three in an organic and a conventional variant (see appendix 2 for a detailed specification of 
each category). Further, in order to reduce the importance of time period to time period dynamics 
caused by storable foods we also aggregate over time into 14 week periods. 
  Aggregate group/time period prices are constructed for each household for each of the six 
food groups as Fisher price indexes with common base prices. The basic observations being 
aggregated over are close to the EAN-bar code level which is a very detailed grouping (e.g. 
organic whole milk in a 1 liter carton of a specific brand sold in a specific store chain in a specific 
week). At this level prices are calculated as registered expenditure in the consumer diary divided 
by the number of units purchased as registered in the consumer diary. After aggregation quantity 
index are calculated as aggregate expenditure divided by the aggregate price index.   
The thus aggregated GfK-dataset
11 covers 14 time periods of 14 weeks duration each 
spanning April 1997 to December 2000. The data contains 26114 observations from 2947 
                                                 
11 In addition to the specified aggregation we have also deleted observations of food purchased from gas-stations, 
kiosks etc. Because of the fairly strict Danish opening hours regulations for normal stores we believe that these 
purchases often are the result of ‘unusual’/non-optimizing behavior like forgetting to purchases something before 
normal closing hours. Though these purchases only account for a small part of total food consumption they are 
characterized by much higher prices and a highly limited range of products to choose from. Modeling results don’t 
differ substantially but significance of estimations is reduced somewhat if these purchases are included. Finally the  
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households. The data set is summarized in figures 1 and 2.  In figure 1 we present budget shares 
out of total food expenditure of five of the six aggregated food categories used in the following 
estimations.  
 
Figure 1: Mean budget shares out of total food expenditure   
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Note: budget share for non-organic other goods is omitted. It is substantially larger than other 
shares causing scaling problems and one minus the sum of the presented shares.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
about 10% of households that at no point during the data period have consumed organic foods and so can not be 
modeled are drooped from the dataset.     
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Figure 2: Mean price index for the six aggregate food goods  
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Off hand variation in mean shares and prices over time does not vary allot. However, share and 
price variation is substantially larger for the typical household so that there is ample variation 
to estimate the household level equations that is our goal. 
Finally it is important to note that the various estimations presented in the following use 
different subsets of the aggregated dataset that is summarized in figures 1and 2. In the next section 
we present an integrated discussion of the chosen model setup, data aggregation and the final data 
selection in connection with each estimation. 
 
5. Estimation and Results   
When developing an estimation setup for household level week by week purchase accounts a 
number of issues must be addressed: 
1.  data contains a large number of zero purchase observations (i.e. observations where 
consumers report no purchases within one or more of the six food groups), 
2.  Since households only report about 80% of the weeks they participate there are many 
‘wholes’ in the week to week time series for each family, 
3.  storable foods may cause substantial time period dynamic, 
4.  Seasonal demand variation and trends, 
5.  Advertising, information campaigns and other media information on organic foods etc.  
 
 Ad  1)As noted above our ambition is to cover all organic consumption which forces 
us to consider fairly aggregated commodity groups. Even so we find a large number of zero 
consumption observations in weekly data (especially for organic variants reflecting that for 
many households only a small part of food consumption is organic). When a data observation 
contains a zero consumption observation the corresponding non-negativity constraint has been 
active in the consumer optimisation that generated the data observation. This then gives rise to 
estimation difficulties because for any given utility function the parameters of the derived 
demand system will differ depending on which (if any) non-negativity constrains are active. 
One way to get around this is simply to restrict the data set to e.g. observations of internal  
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solutions (where no consumption categories are zero). Doing this generates unbiased 
parameter estimates but since information in data observations with corner solutions is 
discarded there is a potential efficiency gain to be reaped if the discarded observations could be 
exploited.   
  Lee and Pitt (1986 and 1987) have developed an estimation procedure where data 
with corner solutions can be included in the estimation. The idea of the procedure is to use the 
demand system derived with out active non-negativity constraints on data with corner solutions 
while replacing the actual price of the zero consumption good with its shadow price (i.e. the 
price that with out non-negativity constraints would result in zero consumption). The actual 
price of the unconsumed good must be an upper bound on the shadow price and the Lee and 
Pitt procedure utilising this constraint in the estimation.  
  Use of the Lee and Pitt procedure requires that prices of zero consumption goods that 
in our data are unobserved can be constructed. In our case there is no obvious way of doing 
this since the missing price is a household specific aggregate index whose composition we can 
not know. An added problem in our case is that to some extent corner solutions may be the 
result of dynamics caused by storable goods (i.e. a zero purchase being the result of large 
stores of the good rather than a high price). Though the latter problem can be addressed by 
aggregation over time we do not feel that a potential efficiency advantage of the Lee and Pitt 
procedure in our case justifies the risk of biasing estimates through ‘ad hoc’ construction of 
unobserved prices of un-purchased goods. In addition the estimation and testing to be 
undertaken is in it self rather complex so that we in other respects wish to keep the setup as 
simple as possible. Thus we choose simply to restrict the data set to observations of internal 
solutions where no consumption categories are zero.  
  As noted this does not bias parameter estimates however we may incur a cost in that 
representativity of the sample could be reduced. Deleting some of the observations from a 
given household only reduces estimation efficiency, but if all household observations are 
deleted the household falls out of the estimation all together. Since households with small 
organic budget shares have a higher probability of zero consumption observations more 
observation from these households are deleted. This may in turn causes a higher proportion of 
low organic share households to fall out of the data set all together thereby making the sample 
on which we estimate less representative of the population of Danish organic food consumers. 
In connection with each estimation below we give an indication of the scale of this problem 
which must be kept in mind when interpreting results.  
  Ad 2 and 3) The many ‘wholes’ in the time series for each family (caused by missing 
diaries and  by eliminating observations with corner solutions) make modeling of the week to 
week dynamics caused by storable foods problematic. By aggregating over time (while 
adjusting for missing weeks) prior to deleting observations with corner solutions we are able to 
reduce the dynamics caused by storable goods and also the number corner solutions. Here we 
aggregate into 14 week periods, which is long enough that we expect the dynamics of storage 
to be reduced substantially for many foods while still giving a reasonable number of 
observations per household. 
  Ad 4 and 5) Since we do not have comprehensive data on advertising, information 
campaigns, and other media information we introduce dummy variables for each time period. 
These capture variation over time affecting all households and so are hopefully able to control 
for most of the effect of these missing variables as well as capturing seasonal variation etc.    
  
Testing for Weak Separability   
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We use the Browning/Maghir procedure to test for separability of each of the three food type 
groups (dairy products, cereals, and other products). The AIDS system for the given food type 
i and variant k for household h group consists of two budget share equations: one for the 
organic variant (k=o) and one for the non-organic variant (k=c) of the following form (see 
equation(18)): 
 
 
,
( )l n ( ) l n ( / ( , ))
ikh t h irh h h h h
ikh ikt ik ikir i
tr o c
wD x p x y a p x ηω α γ β
−− + −
=
=+ + + + ∑∑    (22) 
 
where  ikh η  is the household specific fixed effect for budget share ik, 
t D  are time period 
dummies and ikt ω the corresponding parameters for budget share ik.  Following (17) the log 
price index becomes: 
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We define the following functions of the conditioning variables: 
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so that estimation is conditioned on the ratio of organic to non-organic quantities for all other 
food types. Homogeneity and symmetry is assumed and estimation is done by mean correcting 
all variables with household means so as to sweep out fixed effects (these are then calculated 
after estimation). Technically we estimate the AIDS system by iterating. In the first iteration 
we use the Stone index to approximate the price index  ( , ) a px
+− which is then calculated 
using estimated parameters in the following iterations until the relative parameter change when 
re-estimating is lower than 0.001%.  
  When estimating we assume that prices are exogenous while the budget  y and  the 
conditioning variables may be endogenous. These are all instrumented initially where we use 
total expenditures on daily goods for the household (assumed to be exogenous) as an 
instrument for the food type budget y and non-organic prices as instruments for the 
conditioning quantity ratios.
12 The system is estimated with SAS: Proc Model using the GMM 
                                                 
12 An advantage of the Browning /Maghir approach is that zero consumption in conditioning variables is 
unproblematic thus we only need to delete observations with zero consumption in the modelled subsystem. However, 
since no price observations are available for zero consumption observations we are left with no obvious instrument 
for organic conditioning quantities if  () i x α
−  were a linear function of all quantities (remembering that zero 
consumption is found almost exclusively among organic quantities). This is why we have chosen to condition on the 
ratio of organic to non-organic quantities using the non-organic price as an instrument. All instruments are highly 
significant when regressed on the variable for which it is thought to be an instrument. Correlation of the set of 
instruments with potentially endogenous variables is typically between 0.05 and 0.15. Finally to ensure consistencey 
when calculating  ( , ) a px
+−we use the predicted values from the regression of instrumented variables on all  
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method after one of the two equations was eliminated to avoid simultaneity: All estimated 
models are highly significant with expected compensated signs of predicted budget shares for 
almost all observations, for own and cross price elasticities in all cases for over 70% of the 
observations and typically for 85-95% of the observations, and for budget elasticities typically 
for over 90% of the observations  (see appendix 3). 
  In table 1 we present for each of the three food types Sargan test  of exogeneity of 
surplus instruments for the estimation with all the potentially endogenous variables 
instrumented and for the estimation where conditioning variables are not instrumented (but the 
budget is instrumented) as well as the Hausman test of exogeneity of conditioning variables.   
 
Table 1 
Test of exogeneity of instruments and conditioning variables  
Dairy Products: 
Sargan test of Exogeneity of instruments, Conditioning variables instrumented 
Sargan test of Exogeneity of instruments, Conditioning variables not instrumented 
Hausman test of Exogeneity of conditioning variables 
Test statistic      (P-value) 
2 χ (4)=   7.443    (0.1142) 
2 χ (4)=   2.065    (0.7237) 
2 χ (4)= 16.853    (0.002 0) 
Cereals: 
Sargan test of Exogeneity of instruments, Conditioning variables instrumented 
Sargan test of Exogeneity of instruments, Conditioning variables not instrumented 
Hausman test of Exogeneity of conditioning variables 
 
2 χ (4)=   6.554    (0.1614) 
2 χ (4)=   1.623    (0.8045) 
2 χ (4)=   8.163    (0.0857) 
Other Products: 
Sargan test of Exogeneity of instruments, Conditioning variables instrumented 
Sargan test of Exogeneity of instruments, Conditioning variables not instrumented 
Hausman test of Exogeneity of conditioning variables 
 
2 χ (4)=   2.086    (0.7198) 
2 χ (4)=   4.394    (0.3552) 
2 χ (4)=   4.129    (0.3887) 
Note: budget instrumented in all cases  
  
The results in table 1 indicate that exogeneity of the instruments used is accepted for all models 
at at least a 10% level. When testing exogeneity of the conditioning variables we reject this 
clearly for dairy products while accepting exogeneity at the 5% level for cereals and clearly 
accepting exogeneity of conditioning variables for other products.  
  In table 2 we present tests of separability for both models for each of the three food 
types.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
exogenous variables instead of the original variable values of instrumented variables.  
  
 21 
Table 2: Test of separability   
Dairy Products: 
Conditioning variables instrumented        * 
Conditioning variables not instrumented 
Test statistic          (P-value) 
2 χ (4)=   79.852    (0.0000) 
2 χ (4)=   62.181    (0.0000) 
Cereals: 
Conditioning variables instrumented 
Conditioning variables not instrumented  * 
 
2 χ (4)=   67.634    (0.0000) 
2 χ (4)=   36.396    (0.0000) 
Other Products: 
Conditioning variables instrumented 
Conditioning variables not instrumented  * 
 
2 χ (4)=   86.026    (0.0000) 
2 χ (4)=   51.690    (0.0000) 
Note: * indicates the statistically preferred model (see table 1).  In appendix 3 parameter estimates and a summary elasticity table is presented for 
these models. 
 
As seen in table 2 we reject separability clearly for all three food types irrespective of whether 
conditioning variables are instrumented or not and conclude that the food type separability 
specification (utility model (3)) is clearly inconsistent with our data. We therefore move to 
investigation of the general attribute specification (utility model (5). 
  
System Estimation and Testing for General Attributes 
 
The general AIDS system for household h consists of six budget share equations (one for the 
organic variant and one for the non-organic variant of each of the three food types) with the 
following form: 
 
 
,
lnl n ( / ( ))
ikh t jrh h h
ikh ikt ikjr i
tj r o c
w Dp y a p ηω γ β
=
=+ + + ∑∑ ∑     (25) 
 
As above  ikh η  is the household specific fixed effect for budget share ik, 
t D  are time period 
dummies and ikt ω the corresponding parameters for budget share ik.  The log price index 
becomes: 
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Again we assume homogeneity and symmetry and estimate by iterating with mean corrected 
variables updating the price index after each iteration. When estimating we assume that prices 
are exogenous while the budget  y may be endogenous and therefore is instrumented using 
total expenditures on daily goods for the household as above. The Sargan test for exogeneity 
of surplus instruments (presented in summary table 3) indicates that exogeneity of instruments 
is accepted. The estimated model is highly significant with expected signs of predicted budget 
shares for almost all observations and for own price elasticities in all cases for over 90% of the 
observations, and budget elasticities typically for over 75% of the observations (see table 3).  
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Table 3: Hicks (compensated) own and cross price elasticities for the system estimation 
(The mean, median and standard deviation of the distribution of observation elasticities and the 
proportion of positive elasticities are reported for all demand price combinations.) 
  Dairy products  Cereals  Other products  Budget 
  org non-org org non-org org non-org   
Dairy org         
Mean  -0.511 0.539 0.126 0.436 0.276  -0.8659  -0.017 
Median  -0.785 0.288 0.067 0.225 0.140  0.1084 0.625 
%>0  10.805 99.045 99.045 99.045 99.045  56.4794 74.813 
         
Dairy  non-org         
Mean  0.120 -0.657 0.046 0.168 0.077  0.2462 0.774 
Median  0.099 -0.694 0.037 0.157 0.059  0.3347 0.817 
%>0  100.000  0.449  100.000 100.000 100.000 89.9251  99.419 
         
Cereals  org         
Mean  0.174 0.309 -0.566 0.590 0.138  -0.6450  0.154 
Median  0.167 0.290 -0.635 0.518 0.132  -0.4450  0.282 
%>0  99.045 99.045 13.296 99.045 99.045  25.7678 64.064 
         
Cereals  non-org         
Mean  0.146 0.270 0.133 -0.636 0.069  0.0184 0.718 
Median  0.124 0.253 0.111 -0.695 0.051  0.1494 0.774 
%>0  100.000 100.000 100.000  1.311  100.000 70.0375  98.708 
         
Other  org        
Mean  0.126 0.203 0.046 0.115 -0.820  0.3295 0.785 
Median  0.207 0.288 0.079 0.164 -0.702  -0.0117  0.597 
%>0  98.839 98.839 98.839 98.839  9.831 49.1573 81.835 
         
Other  non-org         
Mean  0.019 0.067 -0.006 0.020 0.011  -0.1105  1.124 
Median  0.006 0.063 -0.011 0.018 -0.001  -0.1102 1.120 
%>0  55.524 89.925 24.813 70.037 47.996 2.7528 100.000 
         
 
As noted own price elasticities have the expected negative sign for most observations while 
cross price elasticities tend to be positive. We also see positive budget elasticities and 
systematically smaller budget elasticities for organic goods then for corresponding non-organic 
good.  
  From casual observation we se generally positive within food type cross prices (one 
implication of the general attribute specification) and except for diary-cereals a tendency 
toward relatively higher cross price elasticities between organic then non-organic variants (the 
other implication of the general attribute specification). For our formal test each household is 
evaluated at mean household exogenous variable values and each of the 6 test conditions (3 
within food type cross price elasticities and 3 cross price elasticity ratio tests).  For each of the 
two types of tests the number of satisfied conditions is summed over all households (with 3 
being the maximum number of passes per household for each of the two test types). The total 
number of passed tests as a percentage of the total number of test evaluations is reported for 
each test type in the first line of table 4 labeled unconstrained model (a detailed table of test 
results can be found in appendix 4). We se that almost two thirds of the ratio conditions are 
satisfied and that almost 90% of the with food type conditions are satisfied.       
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Table 4 
Consistency with general effects specification    
Model: 
 
 
Unconstrained*  
Model 1  
Model 2  
          % of conditions satisfied:                                test against 
 within food type     elasticity ratio tests              unconstrained model  
                                                                       Test statistic        (P-value) 
          89.9%                     61.1% 
          87.1%                     71.2%                  
2 χ (3)=   0.214      (0.9751) 
          82.9%                      91.8%                 
2 χ (3)=   1.752      (0.6254) 
* symmetry and homogeneity imposed in all models 
 
In the following lines of table 4 we report corresponding results from models where parameter 
constraints that increase the number of households that pass the general attribute tests where 
imposed using minimum distance. The minimum distance procedure (see e.g. Johnston and 
Dinardo (1997)) uses the original system parameter ( ˆ θ  ) and covariance ( ˆ V ) estimates to find 
the set of constrained parameters (ω ) that minimise 
21 ˆˆ ˆ ( )' ( ) V χ θω θω
− =− − . We impose 3 
constraints – one for each of the ration combinations: dairy-cereals, dairy-other and cereals-
other. The constraints all have the form:  
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corresponding to the dominating constraint for which we test (i.e. the (r1) constraint in 
appendix 3 turns out to be the relevant constraint for most observations in all three test ratios). 
Constraints are tightened with each new constrained model (i.e. as we move down in table 4).  
Intuitively the procedure finds the set of parameters - among those sets ensuring a curtain level 
of test passing - that minimizes the statistical difference from the unconstrained parameter 
estimates.  The
2 χ  value follows a chi-squared distribution with the degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of constraints (3 in our case). The minimum distance procedure is a convenient 
way of imposing complex constraints (avoiding complicated re-estimation) while giving a test 
statistic that allows us to evaluate significance of the imposed constraints.  
  We se from table 4 that one can impose constraints that increase the rate of passed 
elasticity ratio tests to over 90% (with only a small drop in the pass rate of within group cross 
price elasticities). Thus the estimated model does not differ statistically from a model where 
almost all cross price restrictions implied by general organic attributes are satisfied. We 
conclude that the estimated system is characterized by organic crowding out in a majority of 
evaluation points and that we can not reject a model characterized by organic crowding in over 
90% of the evaluation points. This and the fact that within food type cross price elasticities are 
positive in over 80% of the relevant evaluation points for all models leads us to the conclusion 
that our data (and the estimated model) is consistent with the general organic attribute 
specification (utility model (5)). It is, however, important to stress that we can not rule out the 
possibility that some other utility function structure has generated the observed pattern of price 
effects. 
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Some implications 
 
The empirical evidence against the separability assumption is firm. This implies that systems 
estimated on our data assuming separability will be biased.   
  The presence of organic crowding out and positive within food type cross price 
elasticities is evidence in support of general organic attributes - even though other utility 
specifications could also have generated this pattern. A general knowledge of the structure of 
consumer utility functions may be useful in a number of settings. One might, for example, 
expect that organic food promotion campaigns focusing on general organic attributes could  be 
effective if general organic attributes (as our results suggest) are important for household 
behavior. If general organic attributes on the other hand were not important for consumer 
behavior then promotion campaigns might be more effective if they focused on food specific 
attributes. 
  The detected presence of organic crowding out (irrespective of the specific utility 
structure that has generated it) may in itself have important policy implications.  As noted in 
the introduction previous studies indicate that organic price premium reductions have a 
substantial effect on the organic market shares in most food submarkets. However, organic  
crowding out could cause the potential for increasing the aggregate organic food share through 
price premium reductions to be substantially lower. In table 5 we present the effect on 
consumption of subsidising organic food. In the first column of the percent increase in 
aggregate organic quantity (sales evaluated at pre-subsidy prices) that result from a 1 per cent 
reduction in all organic prices. In the following column the same aggregate subsidy expenditure 
as implied in the first column is used to subsidise organic dairy prices while other organic 
prices are unchanged. In the following columns this expenditure is used to subsidize organic 
cereals and other organic products.  
 
Table 5: Effects of subsidies on organic demand   
 Subsidies  generating 
    1% fall in all 
organic prices   
Same Subsidies 
expenditure 
allocated to reduce 
Organic Dairy  
prices only 
Same Subsidies 
expenditure 
allocated to reduce 
Organic cereals  
prices only 
Same Subsidies 
expenditure 
allocated to reduce 
Organic other  
prices only 
% increase in 
total organic 
quantity 
consumed 
 
Unconstrained  
Model 1  
Model 2  
 
 
 
 
 
         0.659%                            0.726%                         0.642%                        0.565% 
         0.611%                            0.696%                         0.569%                        0.506% 
         0.509%                            0.615%                         0.460%                        0.372% 
Note: effects assume constant aggregate food budget. Thus the actual effect of a subsidy will depend on how it is 
financed (net income effects on consumers) and on substitution between food and other consumption. 
 
We see that  aggregate organic elasticities for the estimated unconstrained model are in fact 
relatively small. As expected we also see that as organic crowding out increases (moving down 
the table) aggregate demand effects of subsidies fall. Finally we note that differentiating 
subsidies is an advantage i.e. concentrating on dairy products is a slightly most effective way to 
increase aggregate organic food shares.  
  Turning now to the food budget elasticities reported in table 3 we found 
systematically smaller budget elasticities for organic goods then for corresponding non-organic  
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good. This finding may be a result of aggregation. If organic market shares tend to be higher 
for goods with low budget elasticities the our finding could be a caused by differences in 
composition of the food aggregates used in the estimation rather then reflecting differences in 
budget elasticities at the disaggregated level. Our result could, on the other hand, also reflect a 
lower budget elasticity for organic attributes than for most food type attributes.  
Irrespective of the cause our result suggests that organic budget shares generally fall as income 
rises
13. One interesting implication is that organic farmers face less variation in demand due to 
income fluctuations then do conventional farmers.  
  Finally as discussed above our study has limitations regarding representativity that 
must be stressed. Both separability models and the full demand system model are estimated on 
subsets of the data. In the first column of table 6 we report the total number of households in 
our data that have purchased organic food and the mean organic budget share for each of the 
three food types. In the following columns we report the corresponding numbers for the data 
sets on with the separability models and the full system model is estimated. 
 
Table 6: Repersentativity of results   
  Full dataset***    Dairy products 
separability  
model 
Dairy products 
separability  
model 
Dairy products 
separability  
model 
Full system 
model  
Number of 
households*  
 
Mean organic 
budget share**: 
 
Dairy products: 
Cereals: 
Other products: 
 
 
         2947                      1910                       1801                       1982                       955 
 
 
 
 
       0.0227                   0.0295                   0.0268                     0.0261                  0.0440 
       0.0077                   0.0089                   0.0103                     0.0091                  0.0146 
       0.0149                   0.0176                   0.0176                     0.0183                  0.0285 
* number of households that consume organic food in the data period,  
** mean over households weighted with mean food budget. 
*** as noted in the data section this dataset is representative of Danish consumers in a number of dimensions 
 
We see that the number of households is reduced for the separability models and substantially 
so for the system estimation. Further mean organic budget shares are somewhat higher for the 
samples on which separability is tested and about twice as high for the sample on witch the full 
system is estimated. Thus we can not rule out the possibility that separability might hold for 
light users of Danish organic food not covered by our tests. Further it is possible that the 
system estimation results for light organic users could differ from those reported here covering 
medium to heavy users.    
  It should also be stressed that we can not from our study precisely characterize the 
                                                 
13 This may seem surprising since most other studies (see e.g. those surveyed in Thompson (1998) and Wier and 
Calverley(1999)) suggest that organic budget shares either rise with or are un-affected by income. However, most 
previous studies utilize cross section questionare data implying a danger that observed positive income effects are 
spurreas .i.e that organic budget shares are positively affected by e.g. education level, family background or other 
unobserved household characteristics which also may be correlated with income. One advantage of our model is that 
it utilizes the panel structure of data and so controls for all (also unobserved) time invariant household characteristics 
(captured in the fixed effects). Thus the budget elasticites in our estimation only reflects household reactions to 
income changes over time (holding all time invariant household characteristics constant). Budget elasticities derived 
from cross section data may also reflect differences between households in unobserved time invariant characteristics.  
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general organic attributes that affect consumer behavior. From other studies (see above) we 
know that consumers often mention healthiness and environment friendliness as typical organic 
characteristics but we do not know if both or perhaps only one is perceived as a general 
attribute.       
  
6. Conclusion 
 
  In this paper we develop a utility model with general organic attributes and derive 
implications for consumer demand. We then exploit a unique Danish micro panel where food 
demand registered on a disaggregated level in all cases has an indicator of weather the good is 
organic/non-organic to test the model empirically. The household level panel data makes it 
possible to identify household specific parameters so that we can estimate household level 
demand systems. Our analysis covers Danish medium to heavy organic food consumers. 
  The empirical evidence against the separability assumption is firm for this group of 
consumers. This implies that systems estimated on our data assuming separability will be 
biased. We find that our data is consistent with organic crowding out in this part of the Danish 
food market. We find relatively small aggregate organic own price elasticities on the order of 
minus 0.5 and find systematically lower food budget elasticities for organic foods than for 
corresponding non-organic foods.  
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Appendix 1: Cross-price elasticity restrictions with general organic attributes. 
 
From equation (20) it is clear that without the general attribute effect ( /0
oj o p δλ δ = ) the 
following holds:   
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=          ( a 1 )  
 
From classic separability results (see e.g. Pudney (1981) ) we know that compensated 
elasticities take the form 
irj k
ir i
jk j
x x
s
y y
δδ
δδ
=Φ  where y is total expenditures. Thus barring 
inferiority of food type attributes the sign of the elasticity is given by 
i
j Φ  so that either all four 
elasticities (
io
jo s ,
ic
jo s ,
io
jc s ,
ic
jc s ) are positive (the two food type attributes are substitutes) or they 
are all negative (the two food type attributes are complements). Using the structure of 
equation (a1) these two combinations are illustrated with signs while arrows indicate the 
direction that the general attribute will push the elasticity as indicated in (14). The ? in the 
place of the equals sign indicates that our task is to find the relationship that is consistent with 
the effect of introducing general attributes : 
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If signs don’t change when the general attribute effect is introduced the following relationships 
must hold: 
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Introducing sign changes one at a time the following sign combinations are possible:  
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where the indicated relationship always will be satisfied. With both possible sign changes occur 
we get the following, irrespective of our starting point: 
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       ? 
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 (r7) 
where any of the possible relationships (>,=,<) between the ratios may result.  
  Considering the starting point and direction of change indicated in (a2) all the nine 
remaining possible sign combinations can not be generated from (a2) by introduction of  the 
general attribute effect.  
  Thus after estimating a demand system and calculating  cross-price elasticities it is 
possible to check if the resulting sign combination for any two pairs of organic/non-organic 
food types could have been generated by a general organic specification and if so whether the 
relationship indicated above (where only (r1) and (r2) are real constraints) are satisfied.  
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Appendix 2: Detailed list of aggregated food groups. 
 
The aggregated group Dairy products consists of: 
•   Milk, cream, buttermilk etc. 
•   Butter, margarine, mixed products etc. 
•   Cheese 
•   Yogurts, cream fraiche etc. 
The aggregated group Cereals consists of: 
•   Bread 
•   Flower, backing mixes etc. 
•   Oats, cornflakes and other breakfast cereals 
•   Spaghetti, pasta, noodles, rice etc. 
The aggregated group Other foods consists of all other foods including e.g.: 
•   Coffee, tee etc. 
•   Frozen foods 
•   Canned foods 
•   Meats and fish 
•   Fruits and vegetables 
•   eggs 
•   Juices 
•   Beer and wine 
•   Deserts and sweets 
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Appendix 3: Elasticities and parameter estimates from conditional models  
 
Interpretation of elasticities should be done with care. These are unbiased but conditional on 
other goods not adjusting to the price change which they in reality will do. In fact Browning 
and Meghir (1991) conclude that ’indeed, just about the only thing for which we can check 
[using these estimations] is separability’.    
 
Hicks (compensated) own and cross price elasticities for conditional estimations 
(The mean, median of the distribution of observation elasticities and the proportion of positive elasticities are 
reported for all demand-price combinations. Corresponding for budget elasticities reported in the last column) 
         Dairy products
 
  org          non-org    
    Cereals 
 org            non-org      
    Other products 
 org            non-org      
Budget 
Dairy org 
Mean   
median  
%>0   
 
Dairy non-org 
Mean   
median  
%>0    
 
 
 -0.5661      0.5661   
 -0.6207      0.6207   
  6.4299    93..5701   
   .           .       
 
  0.1808     -0.1808   
  0.1127     -0.1127   
92.4305      7.5695 
   
   0.6554 
   0.8254 
88.2299 
    . 
 
  1.0321 
  1.0281 
99.9917 
  
Cereals org 
Mean   
median  
%>0   
 
Cereals non-org 
Mean   
median  
%>0    
 
   
   -0.5678      0.5678      
   -0.4994      0.4994     
  12.4547     87.5453 
   
      .           .           . 
    0.1152     -0.1152     
    0.0758     -0.0758    
  85.1268    14.8732   
 
    
    0.953 
    0.984 
 99.589 
 
 
    1.010 
    1.002 
100.000 
Other org 
Mean   
median  
%>0   
 
Other non-org 
Mean   
median  
%>0    
 
   
 -0.8005      0.8005   
 -0.8040      0.8040    
  6.1700    93.8300    
 
     .           .           . 
  0.0349     -0.0349      
  0.0189     -0.0189      
86.8322     131678     
 
 
     1.004 
     0.997 
   99.036 
       . 
 
    1.002 
    1.000 
100.000 
 
Note: Dairy  elasticities based  on estimation with instrumented conditioning variables while cereals and  other products are based on estimations 
where conditioning variables are not instrumented. 
 
 
  
Parameter estimates and standard errors ??? 
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Appendix 4: Elasticities, general attribute test specification and parameter estimates 
from conditional models 
 
General attribute tests for system estimations  
(The percentage of households satisfying the indicated general attribute condition)  
      Dairy products
 
  org       non-org    
    Cereals 
org       non-org      
  Other products 
Org       non-org      
 
Dairy org 
 
Dairy non-org 
 
 
      
       100.00% 
         
  
 
Cereals org 
 
Cereals non-org 
 
 
       
        20.62% 
 
   
        100.00%      
    
 
 
 
Other org 
 
Other non-org 
 
 
        
        81.88% 
 
       
         80.73% 
 
 
          69.63% 
  
 
Note: each household is evaluated at mean household exogenous variable values  
 
Parameter estimates and standard errors ???  
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